Last week, the country convulsed with outrage over Missouri Republican Rep. Todd Akin’s
that
women who are raped have a special bodily defense mechanism against
getting pregnant. Akin’s claim stood out due to its highly offensive
nature, but it’s reminiscent of any number of other parallel cases in
which conservative Christians have cited dubious “facts” to help
rationalize their moral convictions. Take the twin assertions that
having an abortion causes breast cancer or mental disorders, for
instance. Or the denial of human evolution. Or false claims that
same-sex parenting hurts kids. Or that you can choose whether to be gay,
and undergo therapy to reverse that choice. The ludicrous assertion
that women who are raped have a physiological defense mechanism against
pregnancy is just part of a long litany of other falsehoods in the
Christian right’s moral and emotional war against science.
has
appeared with uncanny timing in the journal Social Psychological and
Personality Science, underscoring what is actually happening when people
contort facts to justify their deep seated beliefs or moral systems.
Perhaps most strikingly, one punch line of the new research is that
political conservatives, like Akin, appear to do this significantly more
than political liberals.
In recent years, the field of moral
psychology has been strongly influenced by a theory known as “moral
intuitionism,” which has been championed by the University of Virginia
psychologist Jonathan Haidt. Dealing a blow to the notion of humans as
primarily rational actors, Haidt instead postulates that our views of
what is right and wrong are rooted in gut emotions, which fire rapidly
when we encounter certain moral situations or dilemmas—responding far
more quickly than our rational thoughts. Thus, we evaluate facts,
arguments, and new information in a way that is subconsciously guided,
ormotivated, by our prior moral emotions. What this means–
–is
that when it comes to evaluating facts that are relevant to our deep
seated morals or beliefs, we don’t act like scientists. Rather, we act
like lawyers, contorting the evidence to support our moral argument.
But are we all equally lawyerly? The
new paper,
by psychologists Brittany Liu and Peter Ditto of the University of
California-Irvine, suggests that may not actually be the case.
In
their study, Liu and Ditto asked over 1,500 people about their moral and
factual views on four highly divisive political issues. Two of them–the
death penalty and the forceful interrogation of terrorists using
techniques like water-boarding–are ones where liberals tend to think the
act in question is morally unacceptableeven if it actually yields
benefits (for instance, deterring crime, or providing intelligence that
can help prevent further terrorist strikes). The other two–providing
information about condoms in the context of sex education, and embryonic
stem cell research–are ones where conservatives tend to think the act
in question is unacceptable even if it yields benefits (helping to
prevent unwanted pregnancies, leading to cures for devastating
diseases).
In the experiment, the subjects were first asked about
their absolute moral beliefs: For instance, is the death penalty
wrongeven if it deters others from committing crimes? But they were also
asked about various factual aspects of each topic: Does the death
penalty deter crime? Do condoms work to prevent
pregnancy? Does embryonic stem cell research hold medical promise? And
so on.
If you believe some act is absolutely wrong, period, you
shouldn’t actually care about its costs and benefits. Those should be
irrelevant to your moral judgment. Yet in analyzing the data, Liu and
Ditto found a strong correlation, across all of the issues, between
believing something is morally wrong in all case–such as the death
penalty–and also believing that it has low benefits (e.g., doesn’t deter
crime) or high costs (lots of innocent people getting executed). In
other words, liberals and conservatives alike shaded their assessment of
the facts so as to align them with their moral convictions–establishing
what Liu and Ditto call a “moral coherence” between their ethical and
factual views. Neither side was innocent when it came to
confusing “is” and “ought” (as moral philosophers might put it).
However,
not everyone was equally susceptible to this behavior. Rather, the
researchers found three risk factors, so to speak, that seem to worsen
the standard human penchant for contorting the facts to one’s moral
views. Two those were pretty unsurprising: Having a strong moral view
about a topic makes one’s inclination towards “moral coherence” worse,
as does knowing a lot about the subject (across studies, knowledge
simply seems to make us better at maintaining and defending what we
already believe). But the third risk factor is likely to prove quite
controversial: political conservatism.
In the study, Liu and Ditto
report, conservatives tilted their views of the facts to favor their
moral convictions more than liberals did, on every single issue. And
that was true whether it was a topic that liberals oppose (the death
penalty) or that conservatives oppose (embryonic stem cell research).
“Conservatives are doing this to a larger degree across four different
issues,” Liu explained in an interview. “Including two that are leaning
to the liberal side, not the conservative side.”
There is a
longstanding (if controversial) body of research on liberal-conservative
psychological differences that may provide an answer for why this
occurs. Conservatives, Liu notes, score higher on a trait called the
need for cognitive closure,
which describes a feeling of discomfort with uncertainty and the need
to hold a firm belief, a firm conviction, unwaveringly. Insofar as a
need for closure pushes one to want to hold coherent, consistent
beliefs–and makes one intolerant of ambiguity–it makes sense that
wanting to achieve “moral coherence” between one’s factual and moral
views would also go along with it. Conservatives, in this
interpretation, would naturally have more conviction that the facts of
the world, and their moral systems, are perfectly aligned. Liberals, in
contrast, might be more conflicted–supportive of embryonic stem cell
research, for instance, but nourishing doubts about whether the
scientific promise we heard so much about a decade ago is being
realized.
In documenting an apparent left-right difference in
emotional reasoning about what is factually true, the new paper wades
into a growing debate over what the Yale researcher Dan Kahan has
labeled “
ideological asymmetry.”
This is the idea that one side of the political spectrum, more than the
other, shows a form of biased or motivated assessment of facts–a view
that Kahan rejects. Indeed, he recently
ran a different study and found that liberals and conservatives were more symmetrical in their biases, albeit not on a live political issue.
The
question of why some researchers find results seeming to support the
left-right asymmetry hypothesis, even as others do not, remains
unresolved. But the new paper by Liu and Ditto will surely sharpen it.
Indeed, Kahan has already
weighed in on
the paper, acknowledging that it provides evidence in support of
asymmetry, but observing that in his view, the evidence againstasymmetry
from other research remains more weighty.
The upshot, for now, is
that it’s hard to deny that all people engage in goal-directed
reasoning, bending facts in favor of their moralities or belief systems.
But–to butcher George Orwell–it may also be true that while all humans
are biased by their prior beliefs and emotions, some humans are more
biased than others.
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